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DO NPEs MATTER? NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES
AND PATENT LITIGATION OUTCOMES
MichaelJ. Mazzeo,* JonathanH. Ashtort &
Samantha ZyontzABSTRACT
It is widely argued that so-called "patent trolls" are corrupting the U.S. patent
system and endangering technology innovation and commercialization at large.
For example, a recent White House report argued that "trolls" hurt firms of all
sizes and advocated for specific policies aimed at curtailing practices thought to
be particularly harmful. Yet the existence and extent of any systematic effects of
so-called "troll-like" behavior, and the implications of modem patent assertion
practices by Non-Practicing Entities ("NPEs"), remains unclear. This article
develops novel empirical evidence to inform the debate over NPEs on patent litigation. Specifically, we conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of more than
1,750 patent infringement cases decided by a judge or jury in U.S. district courts
between 1995 and 2011. We focus on case outcomes, including findings of validity and infringement, and the distributions and values of resulting damage
awards. We find some relatively small differences in terms of lower success rates
and award values in cases where the patent holders are NPEs. Yet across the
subset of cases in which damages are awarded to the patent holders, we find no
significant differences in the distribution of awards between NPEs and practicing
entities. Nonetheless, there are substantial differences in litigation behavior,
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success rates, and award values among types of NPEs (that is, universities, individuals, and Patent Assertion Entities ("PAEs")). Moreover, we find evidence of
certain NPEs engaging in strategic and rational patent acquisition, assertion, and
settlement-licensing practices. We posit that these practices may reflect, or
perhaps derive from, the economic separation of patent rights from their underlying technologies that is represented in NPE approaches to patent assertion.

JEL: CO1; K39; 030; 031; 034; Z18

I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely argued that so-called "patent trolls" are corrupting the U.S. patent
system and endangering technology innovation and commercialization at
large. As an example, one influential study estimated the "direct costs" of
patent troll litigation in the United States in 2011 at $29 billion.' Yet actual infringement awards received by NPEs remain poorly understood. This study
develops novel empirical evidence to inform the debate over the effects of
NPEs on patent litigation and to lay the groundwork for future analysis.
Specifically, we analyze patent infringement awards obtained by NPEs and
their characteristics and systematic value drivers. We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of over 1,750 patent infringement cases decided by a judge or
jury in U.S. district courts from 1995 to 2011. Using this analysis, we examine
the real economic implications of different types of NPEs and modem patent
monetization practices.
There has been significant concern and media attention over "patent trolls" in
recent years. The popular NPR piece "When Patents Attack" exemplifies
common sentiment against the perceived harms inflicted by entities that abuse
the patent system. 2 Concerns about "troll-like" behavior have also dominated
academic debate and patent policy discussions, and recently the White House
has also advocated for specific measures to address patent trolls. The White
House issued a report in June 2013 describing several harmful effects of "troll"
practices, such as an increase in patent suits generally, costs faced by practicing
companies of all sizes from defending and settling infringement claims from
PAEs, and deterrent effects on technology innovation.3 The White House Report
advocated for specific policies to "reduce the extent to which legal rules allow
patent owners to capture a disproportionate share of returns to investment."A
1 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2091210.
When Patents Attack (Chicago Public Media radio broadcast July 22, 2011), available at
www.thisamericanlife.org.
3 Executive Office of the President, PatentAssertion and U.S. Innovation (June 2013) [hereinafter
White House Report], available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.
pdf.
2

4

Id. at 13.
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The FTC's most recent report addressing patent remedies-The Evolving
IP Marketplace, Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition-devoted

several sections to exploring leading scholarship and potential economic implications of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) and other NPEs.5 It examined
leading theories and positions on both ends of the spectrum, exploring possible positive and negative effects of modem patent monetization and assertion
practices. Yet the FTC Report did not evaluate the systematic effects of PAEs
or other NPEs more generally, and it specifically called for new empirical analysis to examine these issues. More recently, FTC Chairwoman Ramirez recently called for a formal "Section 6(b)" study of PAEs and their practices.6
This article studies NPE practices from the basis of patent infringement
remedies and systematic value factors. We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of over 1,750 U.S. district court patent infringement case decisions from
1995 through 2011 to determine whether fundamental distinctions between
NPE and non-NPE awards can be identified. In particular, we focus on two
principal questions. First, we examine the raw data to see how the NPEs are
represented within the universe of decisions over time and how successful they
have been in winning cases. Next, we conduct targeted regressions of damage
values to determine whether NPE status has a statistically significant effect on
award outcomes. This analysis sheds light on the economic effects of NPE enforcement relative to other patent litigants. More generally, this contributes to
an understanding of modem patent assertion practices and the evolving new
economy of patent monetization.
Our key findings include the following: (1) The share of cases where patent
holders are not practicing the invention has remained relatively stable over
time. Given the significant increase in case filings that other studies have attributed to PAEs, our result may indicate a greater willingness of PAEs to settle
litigation before adjudicated outcomes. (2) We also find a noticeable shift from
individuals to patent assertion entities as plaintiffs over the last several years.
This might provide evidence of the upstream remuneration of inventive activity
that PAEs are thought to provide. (3) Interestingly, cases involving awards to
NPEs appear to be evenly distributed by award value across the dataset. Closer
analysis reveals that the distribution of NPE awards is not statistically different
than that of other awards. This may suggest that NPEs face similar litigation
risks as practicing entities and generally do not have superior information that
could advantage them in case selection. (4) Importantly, NPEs are somewhat
less successful in the case outcomes, both in terms of findings of validity and
infringement and in terms of damage award levels in successful cases. (5)

5 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter FTC Report].
6

See Edward Wyatt, FTC is Said to Plan Inquiry of Frivolous PatentLawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2013, at BI.
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There are differences in outcomes when we classify non-practicing patent
holders into finer categories. Specifically, non-practicing firms (or PAEs) have
better results in terms of success rates and award values than individuals and
universities. The trend in overall cases indicates that individuals are involved in
fewer cases in more recent years, with PAEs making up the difference. This
could reflect patent acquisitions and institutional expertise among PAEs relative to other NPE types.
Part II addresses relevant conceptual background and scholarship. Part III
outlines the research methodology employed in this article and presents descriptive statistics about the dataset and results of our empirical analysis. Part
IV discusses policy implications. Part V concludes with questions for future
study.
II. BACKGROUND
This part addresses relevant theoretical background and scholarship informing
our study. First, we highlight some of the definitional ambiguity underlying
the terms "non-practicing entity," "patent assertion entity," and, indeed,
"patent troll." In so doing, we call out the structural similarities between these
entities and their practices and focus on identifying systematic differences (if
any) between different types of NPEs and relative to practicing patent holders.
Next, we provide an overview of some prior studies that have addressed litigation rates involving NPEs and other relevant data.
A. Theoretical Background
The FTC Report notably adopted the definition of "patent assertion entity" in
its assessment of modem patent enforcement and licensing practices. It identified several potential and theoretical concerns with PAE practices, including a
general increase in patent litigation suits, 7 the risk of holdup and excessive
damages faced by practicing technology companies, problems with patent
notice and difficulty in identifying and clearing relevant patent rights,9 and
concerns over patent quality,10 particularly with respect to patents held by
PAEs.
However, the FTC Report also observed that a new marketplace of patent
transactions is developing, and certain practices considered to be detrimental
may in fact have net benefits in this new context. For example, PAEs can
provide remuneration to individual inventors from whom they acquire

7 FTC Report, supra note 5, at 58-59. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012 Patent Litigation
Study 7 [hereinafter 2012 PwC Study].
8 FTC Report, supra note 5, at 78-79.
9 Id. at 77-78.
10 Id. at 7.
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patents."1 In addition, in downstream patent markets, PAEs can provide liquidity for patent transactions and valuation comparisons for fair market
benchmarking.12
Accordingly, as used in the FTC Report, "patent assertion entity" is a broad
and morally agnostic term used to describe a range of patent enforcement and
transactional practices. The term PAE is itself a subset of the broader term
"non-practicing entity." Unlike PAEs, NPEs include universities and other
patent owners that primarily seek to develop and transfer technology. 1 3At a
more fundamental level, the difficulty in labeling bad "patent troll" behavior
reflects a structural ambivalence that is inherent to patents. For example, is it
more legitimate for a university to enforce its patent portfolio than for a patent
litigation fund to do so? Is it preferable for an individual inventor to exploit her
rights directly rather than first assigning her rights to a PAE? Even muddier still
is the question of "defensive" patent portfolios owned by practicing entities. If a
company shields its product lines from competition by enforcing patents that do
not cover those products, is this more socially beneficial than if a PAE sues each
entity indiscriminately in a downstream technology market? Going further, how
should we view large companies that build massive patent portfolios, which they
cross-license to other industry titans1 or hold as arsenals to avoid being sued for
infringing activity? Are these more legitimate uses of patent rights than fund
models focused on monetization?
These questions are not the consequence of modem business practices or
innovation in the ways patent rights are exploited. They arise from the patent
grant itself. There is no requirement for a patent holder to practice its rights in
order to maintain or be entitled to enforce them. Patent rights, like other property rights, are fully transferable and alienable. Exclusive and non-exclusive
licenses can be subdivided to infinitesimal degrees of scope, duration, and
control rights. These features are fundamental to patents and are true for
patents held by universities, inventors, practicing companies, PAEs, and true
"trolls" alike.
Patent infringement awards provide a useful basis to assess the characteristics and effects of NPE litigation, given certain key differences between remedies available to NPEs and other patent litigants. Current U.S. patent law
reduces the chances for NPEs to be awarded injunctions for patent infringement. Post-eBay, damages are generally the sole remedy available to NPEs and

11 Id. at 68-69. See also James F. McDonough, III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View
of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2007) (arguing

that "patent trolls make the patent market more efficient by realigning market participant
incentives, making patents more liquid, and clearing the patent market.").
12 FTC Report, supra note 5, at 69-70.
13 Id. at 62-67.
14 See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, A Keiretsu Approach to Patents, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Feb.-Mar.

2007, at 51.
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other entities that do not practice in the relevant technology market.1 5
Moreover, non-practicing entities by definition are not entitled to lost profit
damages, which require proof of direct competition with the accused infringer. 16 Therefore, in contrast to practicing entities, reasonable royalties are
likely to be the predominant form of remedy available to PAEs and other types
of NPEs. In addition, it should not be overlooked that NPEs, unlike practicing
entities, are largely immune from the risk of infringing patents, given that they
lack tangible operations. Thus, NPEs are exclusively in the position of seeking
damages for infringement, whereas practicing entities may alternatively be
defending against liability.
Accordingly, patent infringement awards offer one potential area of distinction between NPEs and practicing entities from which other, perhaps fundamental characteristics and differences may be identified.
B. Relevant Prior Scholarship
In this article, we conduct the first large-scale analysis of patent infringement
damages awarded to patent assertion entities. Previous studies have undertaken empirical analysis of PAE and other NPE practices from other angles,
and the following paragraphs briefly review certain relevant prior scholarship.
A set of articles published between 2000 and 2004 by Jean Lanjouw and
Mark Schankerman study the predictability and determinants of patent infringement suits generally.1 7 The authors find certain characteristics of litigants and
patents that tend to lead to more or less litigation. For example, the probability
of patent litigation increases if the patent is core to a set of follow-on innovations
for a corporation and if a corporation has closely related rivals and needs to
maintain a reputation for protecting its intellectual property. 18 On the other
hand, corporations that are part of concentrated industries or that have large
patent portfolios are less likely to see litigation. 19 Further, they identify certain
patent characteristics lending to an increased likelihood of suit, most notably a
higher number of claims and more forward citations per claim. 20 However,
these studies did not specifically focus on litigation by PAEs.
An article written by John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Joshua Walker and
published in 2009 studies litigation rates with respect to highly litigated patents
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978).
17 See, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics
of Patent Litigation: A Window
on Competition, 32 RAND J. EcoN. 129 (2001) [hereinafter Characteristicsof Patent Litigation];
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, ProtectingIntellectual PropertyRights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & EcoN. 45 (2004) [hereinafter Protecting Intellectual Property Rights];
Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring
Innovationwith Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441 (2004) [hereinafter Patent Quality].
1s Patent Quality, supra note 17; Characteristicsof PatentLitigation,
supra note 17, at 129-30.
19 Protecting Intellectual PropertyRights, supra note 17, at 48.
20 Characteristicsof PatentLitigation, supra
note 17, at 131.
15

16
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and addresses "trolls" litigation in this context. The authors find that litigation
rates and litigant characteristics vary significantly by industry, especially for the
most litigated patents. 2 1 Moreover, the authors find that among the
most-litigated patents, there are significantly more non-practicing entities than
among the once-litigated patents.
In addition, a prior article addressing litigation rates by Mark Lemley and
Carl Shapiro found that NPEs filed between 30 and 40 percent of all infringement suits in computing and electronic industries during the period studied.2 2
However, other studies have found that NPEs do not initiate a disproportionately large number of infringement suits. 23 Overall, patent litigation rates have
been continually rising, and the 2012 PwC Study found a dramatic increase of
22 percent in cases filed in 2011 versus 2010.24
Despite the focus on litigation rates, very few studies have addressed awards
for patent infringement. In particular, the 2012 PwC Study reports a 10percent higher success rate for practicing companies than NPEs.2 5 The 2012
PwC Study also reported higher median damages awards to NPEs than practicing companies.2 6
In addition, our prior work found that litigation awards generally are highly
systematically predictable and deterministic, and certain factors have a statistically significant tendency to increase or decrease award values.2 7
Interesting and notable work by Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel studied
characteristics of patents acquired by NPEs and found significantly greater
patent scope and quality relative to control groups of patents acquired by practicing firms.2 8 Finally, Lu's article about NPE royalty rates in negotiated trans-

John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua H. Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristicsof the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PENN. L. REv. 1 (2009) (studying litigation
rates of patents in specific industries). See also Shawn P. Miller, What's the Connection Between
Repeat Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial)Defense of the Most Litigated Patents, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 313 (2013).
22 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991
(2007).
23 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemary H. Ziedonis, An EmpiricalAnalysis ofPatentLitigation in
the Semiconductor Industry (Working Paper, 2007), availableat http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-bhhall/
papers/HallZiedoniso7_PatentLitigationAEA.pdf; Gwendolyn H. Ball & Jay P. Kesan,
Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and
Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation (U. Ill. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. LEO9-005, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1337166; Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls,
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents,
87 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1577-78 (2009).
24 2012 PwC Study, supra note 7, at 6.
21

25 Id. at 12.
26 Id. at 7.

Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Explaining the "Unpredictable": An
EmpiricalAnalysisof U.S. PatentInfringementAwards, 35 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 58 (2013).
28 Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-An EmpiricalAnalysis
ofNPEs'PatentAcquisitions,41 REs. POL'Y 1519 (2012).
27
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actions is based on RoyaltySource and ktMINE data.29 He found no difference
between royalty rates obtained by NPEs in licensing negotiations and those
paid to practicing entities. To the extent that licensing occurs "in the shadow"
of litigation, this article gives added reason to question how NPEs fare in litigation and what systematic characteristics of their awards can be observed.
Moreover, given the significant increase in litigation rates that certain other
studies have attributed to PAEs, it is critical to understand the outcomes of
such litigation. If PAE awards are systematically different than awards obtained
by practicing entities, modem PAE practices may have a distinct and possibly
detrimental economic impact on technology innovation and commercialization activity. Conversely, if PAE awards are indistinguishable from other
awards, the issue refocuses to understanding the effects of more but not necessarily different patent litigation and assertion practices.
Notably, regarding terminology, we use the term "non-practicing firms" to
denote NPEs that are not universities or individuals, which we believe most accurately reflects the data. We think such "non-practicing firms" are largely
classifiable as "patent assertion entities," as such term is used in the FTC
Report. As discussed above, whether any particular NPE company, university,
individual, or other patent litigant should be termed a "troll" is largely subjective, and accordingly we refrain from using that term in the analysis.

III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Dataset
In order to take a closer look at the outcomes experienced by NPE plaintiffs in
patent litigation, we began with a database maintained by the accounting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). The PwC database contains all decided
patent cases reported in Westlaw from 1995 through 2011. PwC has used
these data to publish annual reports on the status of patent litigation for its
clients; statistics from these reports have been cited by policy makers in the
most recent patent reform debate and were also an important source for the
FTC Report described above. In addition, our recent article uses information
from the PwC database (supplemented with additional variables) through
2008. The dataset has been fully reviewed and modified by the staff at PwC
since 2008, potentially generating some minor differences between these analyses and those in our previous article. 30
29
30

Jiaqing Lu, The Myths and Factsof Patent Troll and Excessive Payment: Have NonpracticingEntities
(NPEs) Been Overcompensated?,47 Bus. EcON. 234 (2012).
The majority of cases from 2008 and earlier are the same. However, we have been able to collect
some of the patent and party variables through 2008 only. Therefore, the descriptive analyses
use data through 2011, but the regressions use only data from 1995 through 2008. We plan to
revisit these regressions with more complete data in future work.
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Through 2011, the PwC dataset contains 1,751 patent cases in Westlaw
where a decision was made on patent validity and infringement at summary
judgment or trial. Of those 1,751 cases, in 554 the patents were held valid and
infringed. Among those cases where the plaintiffs were successful on validity
and infringement, 421 had available award amounts or were cases related to
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) litigation. There were 45 ANDA
cases with $0 awards (since ANDA cases do not result in damages) and 376
cases with awards greater than $0.31
The coding used by PwC incorporates the NPE designation, so we will use
that abbreviation as we describe and utilize their data. One of the explicit goals
of our article is to employ detailed information about each case to make finer
distinctions among the various kinds of non-practicing entities. Toward that
end, we note that in their 2011 update, PwC added new variables on whether
one of the parties to the suit was an NPE. Of those 376 cases where the plaintiffs were successful and in which damages were awarded, 79 had an NPE
party and 297 had no NPE. The PwC data went further and classified each of
these NPEs as companies, individuals, or universities. Our initial look at the
new data takes into account this initial distinction among NPEs as well. There
are likely further nuances in categorizing NPEs, which we plan to explore in
future studies.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four parts. First, we document information about cases decided-distinguishing between cases involving NPEs
versus practicing companies and further distinguishing among cases in which
the NPE is a company, individual, or a university. We then turn to the outcomes of cases, including whether validity and infringement are found by the
court and the level of damages in cases won by the patent holder, and report
the relevant statistics from the dataset. Finally, we perform straightforward
regressions on the damages data to control for other factors affecting award
size. This allows us to get a more precise estimate of the differences between
NPE and non-NPE cases in the dataset.

B. Case Information
Figure 1 presents the annual total of cases decided each year, broken down by
whether one of the parties was an NPE or not ("No NPE"). Of the 1,751
patent cases in the 2011 PwC dataset, cases containing at least one NPE party

31

It does appear that the number of cases has increased significantly from 1995 to 2011, but that
is most likely due to Westlaw reporting bias. Prior to 2002, federal district courts were not
required to report all cases electronically, so case and award information were limited in those
early years. Starting in 2002, most important case information was available electronically,
which made it easier to obtain patent damage awards. So more likely we are seeing the majority
of cases after 2002.
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Figure 1. Patent cases involving NPEs as a percent of all cases, 1995 to 2011 (N = 1,751)

never reached over 30 percent in any given year. 32 In fact, even though the
number of total and NPE cases has increased over time, NPE cases have
remained a relatively consistent portion of the total patent caseload-in terms
of cases decided-for 17 years. To the extent that the presence of NPEs in
patent litigation has become more pronounced over time (as many commentators have asserted), such trends have not yet shown up in patent case decisions.
This may be due to heterogeneity in settlement behavior or lags in the court
system; in Part IV, we posit possible explanations that seem consistent with
PAE incentive structures, although we think further investigation of this factor
is warranted.
Where the overall share of NPE cases has remained quite stable over the
1995 to 2011 period, there appear to be more substantial changes over time in
the types of NPEs appearing in patent cases. In Figure 2, one can see again
that NPE cases make up less than 30 percent of the cases each year. However,
there has been a noticeable shift in the respective shares of cases involving
NPE individuals and NPE companies. Prior to 2004 and 2005, NPE cases
were dominated by individual inventors, but since then, a larger percent of
NPE cases involved companies. This could be a reflection of the increased
number of IP holding companies and IP aggregators that have entered the
market recently. Also, to the extent the data indicate a shift from individuals to
32 Note that "year" here refers to the date of the decision in the case. Of course, individual cases
may be filed several years before the decision is delivered. Our data end at this decision stage,
and do not include appeals (though many of the decisions in the cases have been subsequently
appealed).
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Figure 2. Patent cases involving NPEs by type as a percent of all cases, 1995 to 2011 (N = 1,751)

firms, it could reflect upstream patent transfers between them (which have
been thought to be a potential benefit of PAEs by providing direct financial
rewards to inventors). As we break down the identity of these parties further,
we plan to focus attention on this trend and try to identify the explanation for
the shift and study its overall impact on the success of patent holders and the
level of damages awarded.

C. NPE Success Rates
Our next set of graphs examines the success rates of patent holders, in terms of
findings of validity and infringement. In all cases across the dataset (the rightmost bar in Figure 3), the patent holder success rate is 32 percent. However,
there is a marked difference in patent holder success rates between cases that
have an NPE party and those that do not. Of the 1,390 cases with no NPE (the
farthest left bar), the success rate is 34 percent. For the 361 cases involving an
NPE, we find that the success rate is more than 10 percentage points lower
(the middle bar in the graph). This is consistent with PwC's findings.3 3
This lower success rate is not equally true across the different NPE categories. As seen in Figure 4, cases involving universities have a higher patent
holder success rate than any other category. NPE individuals do not fare quite
as well, with only a 17-percent success rate. 34 We plan to explore a variety of
33 2012 PwC Study, supra note 7, at 12.
3 This is also consistent with PwC's findings. Id. at 26.
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potential explanations for this phenomenon, including the possibility that individuals may be more likely to bring lower quality suits or may have fewer
resources necessary to obtain a favorable ruling in court. It will also be useful

Do NPEs Matter? NPEs and PatentLitigation Outcomes

89 1

U30%

0
0

25%
20%

15%

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

o No NPE

w NPE

Figure 5. Patent holder success rates by year, 1995 to 2011 (N = 1,751)

to investigate the extent to which the lower success rate of individuals may be
tied to the shift from NPE-individuals to NPE-companies that we documented
in the previous figure.
As we look over time in the dataset between 1995 and 2011, the trends in
patent holder success rates do vary in individual years (Figure 5). For example,
in 2002 and 2003, NPEs appear to have higher overall success rates. However,
in most years, cases with no NPEs have higher success rates. Even in the years
where NPE cases have higher success rates, the difference between the NPE
cases and the non-NPE cases is not more than 10 percent.
Generally, we observe that the percentage of cases involving NPEs has not
changed, and year over year the success rates between NPE and non-NPE
cases are similar (or lower). However, the type of NPE involved does seem to
make a difference to the outcome.
D. Awards and Jury Trials
Next, we look at the number of cases in which damages were awarded, and
whether the cases were decided by judge or jury. Of the 1,751 cases decided
between 1995 and 2011, 554 resulted in a valid and infringed patent. Of those
cases, 421 were ANDA cases or had available damages information (Figure 6).
Consistent with the results described in the previous subsections, most of
the cases with patent damage awards do not have NPE parties. This is confirmed in Figures 7 and 8, which separate out the total number of cases by
NPEs and non-NPEs first and then by each of the NPE categories. It is worth
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noting here that of the NPE cases, the NPE companies are most represented
among the cases with damage awards. This is especially true in the most recent
years of the dataset. As before, we will conduct future research regarding
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Table 1. Damage award distribution, 1995 to 2011 (in millions $ 2011) (N = 376)
Year

Minimum

First Quartile

Median

Third Quartile

Maximum

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

$0.03
$0.02
$0.31
$0.01
$0.29
$0.50
$0.06
$0.02
$0.08
$0.04
$0.01
$0.02
$0.00
$0.01
$0.03
$0.02
$0.00

$0.38
$0.41
$1.38
$0.82
$4.85
$2.07
$1.65
$0.64
$2.12
$0.55
$4.09
$0.77
$0.23
$1.19
$2.54
$0.24
$0.70

$3.51
$4.44
$6.59
$3.24
$16.15
$6.36
$10.24
$5.38
$11.77
$5.35
$10.25
$3.44
$3.57
$2.96
$7.35
$1.85
$8.50

$13.89
$40.07
$21.20
$11.07
$25.54
$20.49
$19.86
$28.13
$28.09
$28.58
$50.35
$24.93
$24.32
$24.01
$20.46
$16.30
$31.00

$91.44
$136.20
$101.96
$235.98
$222.48
$82.44
$99.12
$122.66
$636.43
$182.92
$147.45
$342.43
$1,668.59
$451.20
$1,937.85
$109.09
$593.36

whether the difference between NPE companies and NPE individuals is due
to NPE companies' relative sophistication with IP litigation and larger
resources and the extent to which this may be causing shifts in the types of
NPEs we observe in the data. Also, some of these changes over time could
reflect PAEs acquiring patents from individuals and asserting them, which we
also plan to investigate in future work.
Because juries have been linked to higher damage awards, another interesting analysis was to determine whether NPE cases were more likely to be
decided by a jury. According to Figure 9, there is no difference between the
percentage of non-NPE and NPE cases heard by juries (once ANDA cases are
removed). Based on these data, there is not much evidence to suggest that differences between NPE and non-NPE cases would be driven by the selection of
jury or bench trials. Notably, this result depends on whether ANDA cases are
included-with ANDA cases, just under 60 percent of non-NPE cases were
heard by a jury, whereas 70 percent of the NPE cases were heard by a jury.
However, we believe it is more accurate to exclude ANDA cases, which are necessarily not NPE cases and are only decided on a bench trial, and therefore
may skew the results. Excluding the ANDA cases therefore provides a more
level comparison.

E. Damages Awarded to NPEs
We turn now to an investigation of the size of damage awards. All awards are in
millions of dollars, with dollar values adjusted to account for inflation. All
figures are reported in 2011 dollars. Table 1 presents summary statistics, by
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Figure 10. Average patent damage awards for cases with and without NPEs, 1995 to 2011
(N = 376)

year, of the observed distribution of damage award amounts in the dataset,
excluding ANDA cases. The main takeaway from this table is that, within any
given year, the distribution of damage award amounts is highly skewed.
As a result, and perhaps as seen more clearly in Figure 10, the averages (or
means) vary widely and are highly dependent on a handful of very high awards,
such as the over $1 billion awarded in the Lucent case in 2007 or in the Abbott
case in 2009.
The medians, however, are consistent and never rise above $16 million.
Over the period of our data, these medians remain quite stable-refuting
claims of a substantial trend toward higher damages that have commonly been
made (Table 1). It remains to be seen whether the average and median awards
after 2009 have been affected by court decisions that imposed arguably stronger evidentiary burdens to establish damage awards, particularly in reasonable
royalty cases benchmarking royalties to prior licenses and not permitting
arbitrary percentage rates. 36 However, more data are necessary before the
effect (if any) of such cases can be tested.
3

36

These represent an update from a similar table and graph in our previous article on patent
damages. The numbers here differ due to minor differences in data collection and because the
base was changed from 2008 to 2011. However, our original findings still hold: in each year the
damage awards are highly skewed but the medians remain relatively stable.
See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Cornell
Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); IP Innovation LLC
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v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010); WordTech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated
Network Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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A key question is whether NPE cases result in higher damages than
non-NPE cases. In making a comparison between NPEs and non-NPEs on a
year-by-year basis, we see that the relative small numbers of cases per year generate an uneven pattern. A quick comparison of means in Figure 10 suggests
that NPE cases can result in very high awards, but it is not always the situation
that NPEs have higher awards on average. On the whole, this seems to be more
consistently true in recent years. Because of the relatively small number of
cases annually, we present in the figures below data on medians as well,
though the pattern is similarly uneven (Figure 11).
Since the relatively small numbers make year-by-year comparisons of
damage awards somewhat problematic, in what follows we aggregate the distribution of damage awards across all the years. The bold numbers represent the
aggregate distribution in Figure 12, which shows a very highly skewed distribution of award levels overall. The majority of cases are under $10 million, and
only a small handful (about three percent) are the very large awards over $200
million. About five times as many awards are in the under $0.5 million
category as are in the over $200 million category.
In Figure 12, we also separate out each of the award level categories by their
NPE or non-NPE status. In each distribution category, NPEs make up
between 20 and 30 percent of the total cases. A test for equality of distributions
for NPE and non-NPE awards indicates that the two types of cases do not have
This suggests that NPEs may not
significantly different distributions.
"matter" insofar as award value is concerned. The regressions in our final
section build on this result by further investigating whether NPE cases may be
associated with higher (or lower) awards, while controlling for other factors
that may help determine the size of individual awards.

F. Regression Analysis
To achieve a more precise picture of the difference between NPE and
non-NPE outcomes in patent litigation, it is necessary to control for various
factors that may have an impact on the amount of damages awarded across the
cases. For example, previous studies, including our previous article, have
demonstrated that there is a strong correlation between factors related to the
economic value of the patents at issue in the case and the level of damage
awards. The financial strength of defendants and other case features have a
similar impact. Any measured difference between NPEs and non-NPEs could
be misleading if NPEs are systematically over or under-represented among
cases with an independent correlation with damage award size.
3

A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution functions resulted in a
combined K-S = 0.0782 (p-value = 0.845).
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We address this issue by performing a regression analysis on the damage
award amount data described above, focusing our attention on the differential
impact of NPE presence in the case. Our key explanatory variable, therefore, is
an indicator for cases with an NPE litigant. Suitable control variables include
proxies for the economic value factors described above-specifically, we
include the following in our regression: (1) Number of patents: Individual
cases can involve the infringement of multiple patents, with a higher number
suggesting the potential for more economic harm. (2) Average age of patents:
All else equal, an older patent would have a longer time horizon over which infringement (and therefore harm) may have occurred. (3) Average number of
patent claims: Patents with a higher number of claims may be more economically valuable, leading to higher damage awards if validity and infringement are
found. (4) Average number of forward citations: The economic value of
patents may be positively correlated with the number of times the patent is
cited in future patent applications. (5) Defendant is a Public or Fortune 500
Company: These are proxies for the size of the defendant in the case, as larger
firms are potentially associated with higher damage awards. (6) Dummy for
Jury Trial: Cases decided by juries have been shown to have higher damage
awards (perhaps because of the complexity of patent cases or selection bias by
patent plaintiffs). (7) Time to Trial: Measured in days, this could represent a
measure of the complexity of cases and litigation expenses. (8) Dummy for
ANDA Case: This is a control for ANDA cases since they, as a group, behave
differently from other patent cases. (9) Year of Decision: This can be used to
establish an independent time trend (that is, controlling for the mix of cases)
in the damages data.
We run the regression on all of the observations from our dataset for which
we have damages data as well as information on all of the variables described
above. This limits our dataset to only 261 observations, and we plan to fill in
data on more of the observation in future work. 38 The signs and statistical significance of the control variables in the regressions reported below are consistent with our conjectures of their potential association with award level
outcomes.
As mentioned above, the key explanatory variable of interest in Table 2 is
the dummy variable indicating cases in which an NPE is involved. As the
results show, the presence of an NPE has a negative effect, but the measure of
impact is not statistically significantly different from zero. This means that, if
anything, cases brought by NPEs may be associated with lower damage awards
once trials are decided. This fact appears consistent with the descriptive analysis above, and it may be indicative of a somewhat less substantial liability
threat posed to businesses by NPEs than what is commonly argued.

38

In particular, we have not yet included the data from the most recent years. As such, these
regressions only go through 2008.
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Importantly, our descriptive analysis also suggests that the type of NPE
matters with respect to award amount; accordingly, we investigate this further
with detailed regressions. To examine whether different kinds of NPEs may
have different influences on damage awards, we have included in the regression
below (Table 3) a set of NPE dummy variables to indicate whether the NPE is
a company, an individual, or a university. These more nuanced results suggest
that the negative coefficient on the overall NPE dummy is mainly attributable
to the NPE-University and NPE-Individual awards. That is, universities and
individuals appear to generally receive lower damage awards compared with
NPE companies (or PAEs). Notably, the NPE-University estimated coefficient
is significant at the 10-percent level; by contrast, the NPE-Company coefficient is positively signed and is not statistically different from zero.
It is possible that the types of damages awarded in each case influence the
regression results. Because lost profit awards may be expected to be higher
40
than reasonable royalty awards, 3 9 and NPEs cannot receive lost profits, NPE
damages could appear lower when all patent cases are considered. To address
this question, we ran the same regressions in Tables 2 and 3 on cases where we
knew only reasonable royalties had been awarded (this restriction narrowed the
number of cases to 122).
We find that our earlier results generally hold for this subgroup. The NPE
dummy is negative, but not statistically different from zero (coefficient =
-0.23 1, t = -0.66). When the NPE dummy is broken into its different types,
NPE-University is still negative and significant at the 10-percent level and
41
NPE-Company has a positive, but not significant, coefficient.
Finally, we wanted to determine whether cases with NPEs resulted in
higher infringement awards when a jury decided damages. We again used the
same regressions in Tables 2 and 3, but focused on jury cases (the jury dummy
was removed). In these regressions there are 166 cases. We find that none of
the NPE or NPE subtype variables are statistically significant in this analysis.
This suggests that NPEs are not awarded higher (or lower) damages by juries
relative to practicing entities, all else equal.

IV. DISCUSSION
We focus on the actual outcomes of litigated cases and try to distinguish differential impacts and trends between cases where patent holders are practicing
firms and cases where they are NPEs. Our analysis suggests that decided cases
* This is due to the fact that infringed patent holders are entitled to damages "in no event less
than a reasonable royalty" (see 35 U.S.C. § 284) and so royalties are often the floor for damages.
40 NPEs are generally restricted from receiving lost profits because they do not manufacture or
market a product that embodies the patent. As such, they do not meet the legal test for an award
oflost profits and are limited to reasonable royalties as a damages remedy.
41 NPE-Company: coefficient = 0.259, t= 0.62; NPE-Individual: coefficient = -0.401, t= -0.78;
NPE-University: coefficient= -1.651, t= -1.80. Full regressions are on file with the authors.
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involving NPEs do not resolve differently than cases that involve practicing entities as judged along various dimensions. Patent holder success rates are
somewhat lower for NPE cases than for non-NPE cases and, controlling for
other factors, the damages awarded in cases with valid and infringed patents
are somewhat smaller (though not statistically significantly so).
These findings could suggest that concerns regarding NPEs are overstated
-they are just not as successful in the end as other patent holders. Or, they
may provide evidence that NPEs are enforcing poorer-quality patents or litigating so-called "strike suits" to threaten practicing entities and extort higher settlements. Furthermore, if NPEs are initiating more cases but losing more often
than practicing entities, then it may be reasonable to consider the litigation
costs attributable to NPEs and whether their practices are imposing an unmerited toll on practicing entities. 42
Our findings also suggest that NPE cases are less likely to reach a final decision than cases filed by practicing entities. Specifically, we find that the proportion of NPE cases resulting in final decisions relative to non-NPE cases has
not changed significantly over time. This finding should also be viewed in relation to other studies' observations that filing rates of patent infringement suits
have increased and a particular rise is attributable to PAEs. Taken together,
these results could reflect a greater willingness on the part of PAEs to settle
their patent suits relative to practicing entities.
This observed behavior is consistent with our understanding of PAE incentives with respect to patent suits. By definition, PAEs are not suing their competitors, and their position outside of technology industries may largely exempt
them from the politics that often surrounds, and complicates, litigation between
practicing entities. Rather, they are vertically separated from practicing companies and the technology embodying their patent rights. Accordingly, PAEs may
have fewer reasons to bear the high costs and risks of patent litigation, and may
be more likely to approach patent litigation as a means to obtain returns on their
patent acquisitions. Settlement may be a more rational decision for such PAEs,
even when they hold valid and infringed (and valuable) patent rights. This
insight may have critical importance to companies facing suit by PAEs.
Moreover, it casts patent assertion by PAEs in a new light, and even suggests
that they might employ more efficient forms of patent enforcement than practicing companies.
We also find interesting results when subdividing the NPE patent holders
into finer categories. In particular, PAEs are relatively more successful plaintiffs than other types of NPEs. Also, greater success rates have been shifting
away from individuals and more toward PAEs. This may reflect the emergence
of new firms that aggregate patents or otherwise replace individual patent
holders as parties to lawsuits. In turn, this could reflect PAEs providing remuneration to upstream inventors. More generally, it might indicate that PAEs
42

See Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 21; see also Miller, supra note 21.
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are better at conducting patent litigation than individuals, whether due to
larger resources, specialization of focus, a greater degree of separation from
technology markets, or other factors. Also, there are other possible explanations for the apparent increase in PAE success rates. As PAEs develop in maturity and sophistication, and as their patent portfolios grow, they may be
better positioned to prevail in infringement suits. Additional research could
help explain these trends and analyze their possible implications.
Finally, we find that NPE awards are fairly uniformly dispersed across the
distribution, and the percentage of NPE awards in each category does not vary
significantly. This largely matches the distribution of practicing entity awards.
This result is particularly interesting given the incentive structure of NPEs
(and PAEs in particular) relative to other litigants. As discussed above, by
virtue of their vertical separation from practicing technology industries, PAEs
may be expected to approach patent litigation predominantly as a means to a financial end, and may be less likely to have competitive motives associated with
their patent suits. On this basis, one might expect PAEs to have a greater selection bias toward higher-value cases and settling out those with lower expected
awards. Instead, the observed similarity of distributions suggests that NPEs
may not have an informational advantage over practicing entities regarding
award value predictions that could allow them to selectively litigate only highvalue cases to final decision. Additional research is warranted to investigate
further and test this hypothesis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The fact that NPE damage awards generally, and PAE awards in particular, do
not differ significantly from other awards suggests that modem patent assertion
practices might not be fundamentally different than traditional forms of patent
enforcement. This cuts to the core of the policy debate over PAEs. If PAEs are
not obtaining higher awards or awards with significantly different value drivers
than practicing entities, then we are not observing a different type of patent enforcement on their part. That is, from an awards perspective, "patent assertion" may be no different than other forms of patent litigation. If so, it follows
that PAEs are not obtaining "excessive" awards (unless all patent awards are
"excessive"), and moreover that PAEs are not exploiting patents illegitimately
(unless all patent suits are unjustified).
These results are also important in the context of our previous findings that
patent infringement awards are systematically predictable and deterministic.
In that prior work, we discovered a high degree of systematic predictability of
patent infringement awards, and we concluded that this supports the understanding that the patent is a set of rights subsisting independently from the
legal norms that define it. 43 Our present findings indicate that the same holds
4

See Mazzeo, Hillel & Zyontz, supra note 27.
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true for PAE practices. The predictability of PAE remedies, as an indistinguishable subset of other patent infringement remedies, validates at a systematic level the underlying rights so remediated.
Whether or not the modem rise of patent assertion entities, and corresponding increase in patent assertion, are good or bad for technology innovation remains an open question. There is certainly friction between PAEs and
practicing technology companies. But it should also be recognized that the vertical separation of patent rights from technology embodied by PAEs could
have important advantages. Patent holders without industry ties have incentives to assert their rights indiscriminately and without anticompetitive motivations. Similarly, as the data suggest, they may be more likely to approach
patent litigation rationally and settle when favorable royalties can be negotiated.
These findings indicate that patent assertion practices may enjoy certain efficiencies that derive from the separation of patent rights from patented technology. Although PAEs exploit these efficiencies for private gain, this in itself does
not justify policy intervention. Moreover, these advantages are not necessarily
unavailable to practicing companies. Technology companies may develop novel
ways to hold, license, and enforce patent rights that allow them to unlock corresponding new value potential. With the evolving IP marketplace comes the
innovation of new practices and new entities that redefine patent rights and the
ways they are used.
In future extensions of this work, we plan to press further on the distinction
between the NPE categories and connect them to both patent quality as well as
litigation outcomes. Controlling for the differences between NPEs will further
allow us to suggest particular policies or private strategies to react to the emergence of modem patent assertion practices and business models. We also plan
to continue our focus on the structural differences between PAEs and
practicing companies and further explore the incentives that motivate their
respective approaches to patent litigation.
Returning to our initial impetus for study, the emergence of modern patent
assertion practices forces the question: "Do NPEs matter?" This article finds
that NPEs do matter, although perhaps not in the ways most commonly feared.
Award values are not major points of distinction for NPEs compared with
practicing entities. Yet, there is evidence that "patent assertion" represents a
novel way of exploiting patent rights, and this may have significant implications
for patents and modern technology markets.

